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ABSTRACT
Demand dispatch is the science of extracting virtual energy storage through the automatic control of
deferrable loads to provide balancing or regulation services to the grid, while maintaining consumer-
end quality of service.
The control of a large collection of heterogeneous loads is in part a resource allocation problem,
since different classes of loads are more valuable for different services.
The goal of this paper is to unveil the structure of the optimal solution to the resource allocation
problem, and investigate short-term market implications. It is found that the marginal cost for each
load class evolves in a two-dimensional subspace: spanned by a co-state process and its derivative.
The resource allocation problem is recast to construct a dynamic competitive equilibrium model, in
which the consumer utility is the negative of the cost of deviation from ideal QoS. It is found that
a competitive equilibrium exists with the equilibrium price equal to the negative of an optimal co-
state process. Moreover, the equilibrium price is different than what would be obtained based on the
standard assumption that the consumer’s utility is a function of power consumption.
1 Introduction
The goals of this paper are twofold: 1) to analyze the structure of the optimal solution to the resource allocation
problem investigated in [2], and 2) to develop an understanding of the potential implications to market design.
1.1 Control techniques for demand dispatch
The term demand dispatch refers to the creation of virtual energy storage from deferrable loads. The key to success
is automation: an appropriate distributed control architecture ensures that bounds on quality of service (QoS) are met
and simultaneously ensures that the loads provide aggregate grid services comparable to a large battery system.
The 2018 IMA volume on the control of energy markets and grids contains several papers surveying distributed control
techniques for demand dispatch [3, 4, 5]. The present work and [2] are based on the results surveyed in [3]: through
distributed control, a heterogeneous population of loads such as residential water heaters can be controlled in such a
way that quality of service (QoS)—in terms of temperature and cycling—of each load obeys strict constraints, while
the power deviation can be adjusted up and down to provide grid services much like a battery system.
For loads such as water heating, air-conditioning, and refrigeration (examples of thermostatically controlled loads, or
TCLs), there is a natural analog with batteries, with thermal energy storage replacing electrical energy storage. This
storage is what allows large deviations in electric power consumption of the fleet, with imperceptible impact on service
to consumers. Ample evidence of this potential is presented in [2, 3] and their references.
∗This is a preprint of the conference paper [1], to appear in the IEEE CDC, December 2019. Funding from the National
Science Foundation under awards EPCN 1609131 & CPS 1646229 is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to funding from the
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The next question concerns the management of a large heterogeneous population of loads. When heterogeneity is
not large (e.g., each load in the collection is a residential water heater, but the size varies across the population),
then additional local control at each load can be designed to make the population appear homogeneous [6, 7]. The
problem addressed in this paper and in [2] is control of a highly diverse population of loads. Along with residential and
commercial TCLs, these might include the residential pool pumps in a region, along with water pumping for irrigation
or waste management. Control of the fleet is a dynamic resource allocation problem, which is formulated as a linear
program in [8] and as a convex program in [2].
The convex program is revisited here. The goal is to gain insight on the structure of the optimal solution for a model
with one source of traditional generation and grid services obtained through demand dispatch of a large population of
loads. It is assumed that there are M classes of loads; in each class, the population is homogeneous.
The QoS for the ith load class at time t is a functional of the state of charge (SoC) xi(t) used in battery models for
thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs) [9] and residential pools [10, 11]. The SoC is assumed to evolve according
to the linear system,
d
dtxi(t) = −αixi(t)− zi(t), (1)
in which −zi(t) is power deviation at time t. Denoting the derivative by
ui(t) :=
d
dtzi(t), (2)
the eqs. (1) and (2) constitute a linear dynamical system with state (x, z) and control input u.
For a given input u, the resulting QoS for load class i is quantified by the integral of cost:
QoSi(u) =
∫ T
0
ci(xi(t)) dt, (3)
where each ci : R → R+ is a strongly convex function. If this is small, then the aggregate SoC is small in an average
sense. This is a necessary condition for each of the loads in the ith class to remain within individual QoS bounds.
Simulation studies and analysis indicate that bounds on this aggregate QoS are also sufficient to ensure that a high
percentage of the population will remain within individual target QoS levels, subject to the homogeneity of the load
collection, the control architecture, the bounds on QoS, and other factors [3, 9].
As in [2], a finite-horizon optimal control problem over [0, T ] is considered, with state cost given by
cX(x) =
M∑
i=1
ci(xi) , x ∈ RM . (4)
The term state space collapse comes from the literature on stochastic networks [12, 13], which may be regarded as a
special case of the model reduction obtained using singular perturbation methods [14].
The collapse demonstrated in this paper is obtained through the special structure of the dynamics of load and genera-
tion. The descriptor dynamics associated with the M -dimensional SoC process are obtained from (1):
d
dtxσ(t) = −αTx(t)− zσ(t), (5)
in which xσ(t) =
∑
xi(t), zσ(t) =
∑
zi(t). The evolution of the aggregate power deviation is similar but simpler:
d
dtzσ(t) = uσ(t).
What is crucial here is that the individual inputs {ui(t)} are not subject to individual cost constraints: it is only the
sum that is subject to a cost indirectly, through the cost on generation ramping. Consequently, the optimal control
formulations considered in this paper fall in the category of “cheap optimal control” [14, 15, 16].
For a cost that is quadratic in (x, zσ, uσ), it follows from the main result of [15] that the solution to the infinite-horizon
optimal control problem has a simple form: There is a one-dimensional subspace X? such that x?(t) ∈ X? for all
t > 0. These results are extended to include the finite-time horizon optimal control problem in [16]; the optimal
control evolves smoothly following a jump at time t = 0 [16, Theorem 5.8].
The findings in the non-quadratic, finite time-horizon setting of this paper are equally remarkable: the marginal costs
evolve in a two-dimensional subspace generated by a co-state process λ? and its derivative; for t > 0:
c′i (x
?(t)) = αiλ
?(t)− ddtλ?(t). (6)
Consequently, optimal SoC for each of the M load classes evolves in a two-dimensional manifold. These results are
surveyed in Section 3.
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Figure 1: The competitive equilibrium price ρ? = −λ? when the nominal net-load ` is piecewise constant. The
quantity and distribution of loads were chosen based on California’s usage [2, 27]. The residential air conditioners and
commercial water heaters exceeded capacity bounds (by a few degrees for a few hours). The optimal generation g? is
nearly constant, despite the 40GW load surge.
1.2 Implications for markets
Section 4 reviews dynamic competitive equilibrium theory, and explains that the negative of the co-state function
may be interpreted as a price in a competitive equilibrium. Extensions of results from [18, 19] are obtained, relating
average marginal cost of generation and average marginal value of load classes to average prices. An example of the
competitive equilibrium price for a model in which the QoS cost functions are all quadratic is shown in Fig. 1. In this
example, the net-load is piecewise constant, and the resulting optimal generation is relatively smooth. The price is
also smooth, and anticipates the surge in load well before its occurrence. The details of the simulation are contained
in Section 5.
The results in Section 4 close a logical gap in the prior work [17, 18, 19, 20, 21] (and many others), in which the utility
function for the consumer is assumed to be a concave function of power, rather than a natural metric such as the QoS
(3).
Consumer QoS is included in the formulation of the competitive equilibrium analysis in [22], but in this prior work,
it is assumed that power consumption from each residential load can be varied continuously; however, the residential
loads considered for demand-side management are typically ON/OFF devices. In the present paper, resource allocation
is performed over load aggregations modeled as virtual batteries. Consequently, the SoC and power trajectories can
be assumed to be smooth—see [6, 11, 23], which discuss the mean-field characteristics of load aggregations under
demand dispatch.
These economic findings should be viewed with caution. It would be naive to think that real-time control can be
achieved using the price signals discovered in Section 4. It is typically assumed that price discovery occurs through an
auction. Do we believe these non-causal prices will emerge from an auction? In the experiments surveyed in Section 5,
the cost functions are modified so that the consumers experience no loss of QoS, and the resulting average price is
nearly zero. How then can these prices provide any incentive for participation?
The resource allocation problem introduced in [2] and investigated in this paper is intended to be part of a model pre-
dictive control (MPC) architecture, while control through price signals is inherently open loop. Imagine attempting to
apply MPC using price signals? The aggregators managing the loads would not be able to predict re-calculated prices
and might make decisions that would create personal losses or windfalls purely based on the control architecture. This
would create uncertainty in the control solution and the long-term sustainability of the grid-aggregator relationship.
For these reasons, it is assumed here that a balancing authority solves the optimal resource allocation problem, and
control of individual loads is achieved through automation.
There is history that supports the belief that automation rather than price signals is the most efficient and reliable
way to control the grid. Following deregulation of the industry in the 1980s, telephone companies investigated real-
time pricing (alternately called “measured rates”) for local service, based on the assumption that measured-rate pricing
could substantially increase economic efficiency. However, looking specifically at the net welfare effects on customers,
studies found that measured rates often result in efficiency losses. In addition, the telephone subscribers had difficulty
understanding and coping with complicated tariff structures, and the systems required to implement them were too
complex [24]. With the integration of distributed energy resources, which are characterized by high fixed costs and
essentially zero variable costs, the grid increasingly has characteristics similar to the telecommunications industry.
Further discussion on these issues is contained in [25].
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The dynamic control problem is introduced in Section 2.1,
which is based on the model introduced in [2]. The major departure from [2] is the relaxation of hard constraints on
any resource. This is reasonable for control outside of a major crisis. The preliminaries required for analysis of the
optimal solution are introduced in Section 2. The main results surveyed in Section 3 demonstrate state space collapse,
and economic implications are contained in Section 4. Numerical simulations are provided in Section 5. Conclusions
and directions for future research are discussed in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Notation
T : time horizon for control
`(t) : net-load on [0, T ], and ` = T −1 ∫ T
0
`(t) dt
g(t) : power from traditional generation; γ(t) = ddtg(t).
M : number of load classes, indexed by i ∈ {1, ...,M}.
xi(t) : state of charge (SoC) of load class i
−zi(t) : power deviation from load class i; ui(t) = ddtzi(t).
Subscript “σ” denotes sum, e.g., xσ(t) =
∑
i xi(t)
For a function K : R3 → R we adopt the standard calculus notation: for ξ ∈ Z3+,
Kξ(r, s, t) :=
(
∂
∂r
)ξ1( ∂
∂s
)ξ2( ∂
∂t
)ξ3
K(r, s, t)
2.1 Resource allocation control architecture
The optimal control architecture is defined by a convex program over the time-horizon [0, T ]:
minimize
g, γ, x
∫ T
0
[
cg(g(t)) + cd(γ(t)) + cX(x(t))
]
dt (7a)
subject to `(t) = g(t) + zσ(t), (7b)
d
dtg(t) = γ(t), (7c)
d
dtxi(t) = −αixi(t)− zi(t), (7d)
d
dtzi(t) = ui(t), i ∈ {1, ...,M} (7e)
with x(0), z(0) ∈ RM given. These equations are adapted from eq. (14) of [2], but the motivations and assumptions
here are different.
The analysis here allows general strongly convex and twice continuously differentiable cost on SoC and generation,
but maintains the quadratic cost on ramping imposed in [2]:
(A1) The net load ` isC1. The cost functions {ci} and cg are non-negative, classC2, and strongly convex: c′′i (x) ≥ µ
for some µ > 0 and all i, x. The ramping cost is quadratic: for fixed κ > 0,
cd(x) = κx
2, x ∈ R. (8)

The objective is to minimize the cost of traditional generation, the cost on ramping of traditional generation, and the
cost on SoC of load classes subject to: (i) the constraint of balancing the net load ` with traditional generation g
and power deviation from flexible loads z, (7b); (ii) the dynamics of generator ramping, (7c); and (iii) the dynamical
constraints on load classes, (7d) and (7e).
The optimization problem (7a) may be regarded as a fully observed, finite-horizon control problem. In order to
put this in state space form, it is necessary to eliminate the algebraic constraint (7b). The resulting state process is
[x(t), z(t)] ∈ R2M , the input is u(t) ∈ RM , and the cost function is obtained by eliminating g(t) and γ(t) from (7a)
using eqs. (7b), (7c) and (8) to obtain
c(x(t), z(t), u(t), t) = cX(x(t)) + cg(`(t)− zσ(t)) + cd˜(u(t), t), (9)
where cd˜(u(t), t) = κ
[
uσ(t)− ddt`(t)
]2
(10)
The total cost in (7a) is the integral of (9). This is a singular control problem because the control cost is degenerate: the
terms involving the control cost in (9) are expressed purely in terms of the sum uσ(t). It is found that this singularity
is a great benefit for obtaining structure for the optimal control solution.
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2.2 Value functions
For t0 ∈ [0, T ), the cost-to-go is denoted,
J?(x, z, t0) := inf
u[t0,T ]
∫ T
t0
c(x(t), z(t), u(t), t) dt, (11)
where the infimum is over continuous u, subject to (7b)–(7e), and with x(t0) = x, z(t0) = z given.
Prop. 2.1 asserts that the cost-to-go can be expressed purely as a function of (xσ, zσ). This is the first evidence of state
space collapse. Denote
K?(xσ, zσ, t0) := inf
x+,z+
J?(x, z, t0), (12)
where the infimum is over x+, z+ ∈ RM , subject to the linear constraints x+σ = xσ , z+σ = zσ .
Proposition 2.1. The following hold under Assumption (A1): for each t0 ∈ [0, T ),
(i) J? is convex in (x, z) and finite-valued.
(ii) K?(xσ, zσ, t0) = J?(x, z, t0) for each x, z ∈ RM 
The proof of Prop. 2.1 and most of the results that follow are contained in the appendix.
For a given initial condition x, z, with the optimal state trajectory {x?(t), z?(t) : 0 < t ≤ T }, denote
λ?(t) = K?1,0,0(x
?
σ(t), z
?
σ(t), t),
β?(t) = K?0,1,0(x
?
σ(t), z
?
σ(t), t) , 0 < t ≤ T .
(13)
In addition to (A1), the following assumptions are imposed throughout the remainder of the paper:
(A2) For each t0 ∈ [0, T ) and each initial condition (x, z), the optimal control problem admits a unique solution
{x?(t), z?(t), u?(t) : t0 < t ≤ T } satisfying
(a) (x?(t), z?(t)) is C1 on the semi-open interval (0, T ].
(b) There are right hand limits at t0, denoted
x?(t0) = lim
t↓t0
x?(t) , z?(t0) = lim
t↓t0
z?(t), (14)
satisfying x?σ(t0) = xσ , z
?
σ(t0) = zσ .
(A3) The value function K? : R× R× [0, T ]→ R is C1.
(A4) The function λ? is C2.

3 State space collapse
Thm. 3.1 unveils the structure of the optimal solution: in particular, the M -dimensional optimal state process x?
evolves on a two-dimensional manifold.
Theorem 3.1. For t ∈ (0, T ], the optimal solution (x?(t), z?(t), u?(t), λ?(t), β?(t)) ∈ R3M+2 is the solution to the
following system of 3M + 2 equations:
d
dtx
?
i (t) = −αix?i (t)− z?i (t), (15a)
d
dtz
?
i (t) = u
?
i (t), (15b)
d
dtλ
?(t) = −c′i (x?i (t)) + αiλ?(t), (15c)
d
dtβ
?(t) = c′g(`(t)− z?σ(t)) + λ?(t), (15d)
u?σ(t) =
d
dt`(t)−
1
2κ
β?(t), (15e)
where i ∈ {1, ...,M}, with the boundary conditions x(0+), z(0+), λ?(T ) = 0, and β?(T ) = 0. 
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Equation (15c) has a remarkable interpretation: the marginal costs for the M different load classes evolve in a two-
dimensional subspace generated by the functions {λ?(t), ddtλ?(t) : t ∈ (0, T ]}. Since ci is strictly convex, c′i is strictly
monotone and invertible. Consequently, the optimal SoC evolves on a two-dimensional manifold:
x?i (t) = (c
′
i)
−1(αiλ?(t)− ddtλ?(t)). (16)
It follows from (13) and Assumption (A2b) that λ?(0+) = K?1,0,0(x
?
σ(0), z
?
σ(0), 0). Then, in consequence of (15c)
and (15a), we have the following:
Corollary 3.2. The optimal mapping (x?(0+), z?(0+)) is obtained by
c′i(x
?
i (0+)) = αiK
?
1,0,0(x
?
σ(0), z
?
σ(0), 0)
− ddtK?1,0,0(x?σ(t), z?σ(t), t)
∣∣∣
t=0
z?i (0+) = −αix?i (0+)−
1
c′′i (x
?
i (0+))
[
αi
d
dtK
?
1,0,0(x
?
σ(t), z
?
σ(t), t)
∣∣
t=0
− d2dt2K?1,0,0(x?σ(t), z?σ(t), t)
∣∣
t=0
] (17)

The remainder of this section concerns two very different interpretations of λ?. The first is easily predicted.
3.1 λ? as co-state
The Hamiltonian with co-state variables λ, β ∈ RM corresponding to system equations (7d) and (7e), respectively, is
denoted:
H(x, z, u, λ, β, t) := c(x, z, u, t)
+
∑
i
λi(−αixi − zi) +
∑
i
βiui
(18)
This notation for the co-state variables would appear to conflict with the notation in Thm. 3.1. The choice of notation
is made clear in the following:
Proposition 3.3. Associated with the optimal input-state (u?, x?, z?) are a pair of co-state variables λ?, β? evolving
in RM and satisfying for 0 < t ≤ T ,
(x?(t), z?(t)) = argmin
(x,z)
H(x, z, u?(t), λ?(t), β?(t), t)
For each i ∈ {1, ...,M} and t ∈ (0, T ],
λ?i (t) = K
?
1,0,0(x
?
σ(t), z
?
σ(t), t) = λ
?(t),
β?i (t) = K
?
0,1,0(x
?
σ(t), z
?
σ(t), t) = β
?(t).
(19)

3.2 λ? and a Lagrangian decomposition
Rather than eliminate the variable g using (7b), new insight is obtained on maintaining g, γ, x as variables in the
optimization problem. First, construct a Lagrangian relaxation with Lagrange multiplier %, as follows:
φ?(%) = inf
g,γ,x
∫ T
0
{
cg(g(t)) + cd(γ(t)) + cX(x(t))
+ %(t)(`(t)− g(t)− zσ(t))
}
dt,
(20)
where as usual, the infimum is subject to (7c)–(7e), with given initial conditions.
This amounts to a Lagrangian decomposition, consisting of the followingM+1 independent optimization problems:
(i) Minimization problem over {g(t), g˙(t)}:
inf
g
∫ T
0
Lg(g(t), g˙(t), t) dt, (21)
where, based on the definition (7c),
Lg(g(t), g˙(t), t) = cg(g(t)) + cd(g˙(t))− %(t)(g(t)− `(t)).
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(ii) Minimization problem over {xi(t), x˙i(t)}:
inf
xi
∫ T
0
Li(xi(t), x˙i(t), t) dt, (22)
where, after accounting for the constraints (7d), (7e),
Li(xi(t), x˙i(t), t) = ci
(
xi(t)
)
+ αi%(t)xi(t) + %(t)x˙i(t).
The Euler-Lagrange equations lead to equations for the optimizers:
Proposition 3.4. For any function % that is continuously differentiable on (0, T ], if g% and x%i are C1 optimizers for
the minimization problems in eqs. (21) and (22), then they solve the following differential equations:
c′g (g
%(t))− ddtc′d(g˙%(t)) = %(t), (23)
c′i (x
%
i (t)) + αi%(t)− ddt%(t) = 0, (24)
with boundary conditions c′d(g˙
%(T )) = %(T ) = 0. 
The dual functional φ? satisfies weak duality: φ?(%) ≤ J?(x(0), z(0), 0) for any %, and the dual convex program is
defined as supρ φ
?(%). The solution to the dual is obtained by combining Prop. 3.4 and Thm. 3.1, and from this we
obtain strong duality:
Proposition 3.5. The dual admits an optimizer given by
%?(t) = −λ?(t) , t ∈ (0, T ].

4 Real time prices
A dynamic competitive equilibrium model is introduced in this section. Prop. 3.5 is applied to establish the existence
of a competitive equilibrium, and other results from the previous section provide approximations of the average price
in terms of both the average marginal value and the average marginal cost.
We begin by recalling basic concepts.
A “snapshot” commodity market for a divisible good G ∈ R is defined based on two “utility functions”: for consump-
tion, UD : R→ R, and for supply, US : R→ R. The social planner’s problem (SPP) of macro-economics is defined as
the optimization problem,
max
G
UD(G) + US(G).
A solution is called an efficient allocation.
If the utility functions are strictly concave, and there exists an optimizer G?, then there is a unique price %? that
achieves the so-called competitive equilibrium (CE):
G? = arg max
G
UD(G)− %?G = arg max
G
US(G) + %?G.
The price %? is the Lagrange multiplier associated with GD = GS in the equivalent formulation of the SPP [26]:
max
G
UD(GD) + US(GS),
s.t. GD = GS .
(25)
Formulations of dynamic CE theory address problems in which G is a function of time and subject to various con-
straints [26]; see [17, 18, 19, 20, 21] for theory in the context of power systems.
The dynamic CE model considered in this section involves M + 1 players: there is a single supplier (or class of
suppliers) that provide traditional generation g and M consumers with power deviation−zi, for 1 ≤ i ≤M . The utility
function for each player is the negative of the cost on the SoC: UDi(zi) = −ci
(
xi) and US(g, g˙) = −cg(g)− cd(−g˙).
The SPP is defined as follows:
max
g,zi
∫ T
0
{
US(g(t), g˙(t)) +
M∑
i=1
UDi(zi(t))
}
dt, (26)
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subject to the balancing and dynamic constraints (7b)–(7e). This is equivalent to the optimization problem (7a) ana-
lyzed in the previous sections.
The Lagrangian decomposition behind Prop. 3.5 is analogous to the Lagrangian relaxation of (7b) in (26), and hence,
%?(t) = −λ?(t) is the competitive equilibrium price at time t, for 0 < t ≤ T . That is, the optimizers of eqs. (21)
and (22) correspond to:
z?i = argmax
zi
∫ T
0
UDi(zi(t)) + %?(t)zi(t) dt,
g? = argmax
g
∫ T
0
US(g(t), g˙(t)) + %?(t)g(t) dt.
Two quantities of special interest in CE theory are the marginal cost and the marginal value at equilibrium. The
marginal cost at time t is c′g(g
?(t)), and the marginal value is defined as the negative of marginal cost for each load:
−c′i (x?i (t)). The averages of these quantities and the equilibrium price are denoted, respectively,
%avg =
1
T
∫ T
0
%?(t) dt,
MCavgg =
1
T
∫ T
0
c′g(g
?(t)) dt,
MVavgi = −
1
T
∫ T
0
c′i (x
?
i (t)) dt.
In the snapshot CE model, it is known that the price coincides with both marginal value and marginal cost — this
is immediate from the Lagrangian decomposition of (25). This conclusion fails in general in a dynamic setting. For
the dynamic CE models considered in [18, 19], it is shown that the price coincides with the marginal value (in which
the marginal value is defined with respect to power consumption), and the average price is approximated by average
marginal cost. These conclusions admit the following extension to the CE model introduced in this paper:
Proposition 4.1. The average of the competitive equilibrium price admits the following approximations:
(i) Weighted average marginal value, plus O(1/T ):
%avg =
1
αi
MVavgi + e
d
i /T , 1 ≤ i ≤M. (27)
(ii) Average marginal cost, plus O(1/T ):
%avg = MCavgg + e
g/T , (28)
where the error terms are the differences,
edi = [%
?(T )− %?(0)]/αi , eg = c′d(g˙%(0))− c′d(g˙%(T )).

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Figure 2: Optimal SoC trajectories remain within capacity bounds throughout this run. The peak generation for the
optimal solution is about 8GW less than what would be required without load control, and the generation ramping is
reduced significantly.
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5 Numerical Simulations
Simulations were conducted to validate the main results of this paper. A discrete time approximation of the resource
allocation problem (7a) was solved with 5 classes of loads: ACs, residential WHs with faster time cycles (fwh),
commercial WHs with slower time cycles (swh), fridges, and pool pumps (pp), based on the SoC model used in [2].
The net-load ` is based on “duck curve” predictions for California in March, 2020; this data is obtained from CAISO.
The results in Fig. 1 were obtained using quadratic cost on the SoC. Alternatives were tested to avoid the SoC violations
(i.e., SoC/Capacity > 1) observed in that experiment. In the results surveyed here, the cost functions are strongly
convex polynomials, ci(x) = κ1(x/Ci)8 + κ2(x/Ci)2, where Ci is the energy capacity of the load class i in GWh.
For each class of TCLs, κ1 = 1 and κ2 = 0.1. Because QoS requirements for pools are less critical, the quadratic
cost is maintained for pool pumps: κ1 = 0 and κ2 = 1. Following [2], the cost on generation is of the form
cg(x) = κg[x − `]2, where κg is a constant gain. Table I provides values of the SoC leakage parameters αi for the
different load classes along with the energy capacities Ci. The numbers are based on [2] and [27].
TABLE I: LOAD PARAMETERS
Par. Unit ACs fWHs sWHs RFGs PPs
αi hours-1 0.25 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.004
Ci GWh 4 2 5 0.5 2
The top half of Fig. 2 shows the net-load ` (duck curve), the optimal traditional generation g?, and the equilibrium
price %? (normalized to ±1 $/unit energy), while the latter half shows the optimal SoC trajectories normalized by the
respective energy capacities, x?i /Ci.
There is remarkable correspondence between the net-load and the equilibrium price signal. As expected from combin-
ing Prop. 3.3 with Prop. 3.5, it is observed that the optimal SoC evolves in tandem with the price signal. For example,
the negative prices in the afternoon lead to hotter than average WHs and cooler than average houses, whereas the
higher prices in the late evening result in colder WHs and hotter houses. The polynomial costs on SoC indirectly
impose QoS: notice that x?i /Ci is between ±1, which implies that the SoC for each load class is within the energy
capacity limit.
The optimal SoC trajectories evolve in a two-dimensional subspace. Consequently, the optimal SoC trajectory of any
load class can be recovered based on observations of the SoC for two other load classes. In particular, given the optimal
SoC of residential water heaters and ACs, we can recover the functions {λ?(t), ddtλ?(t) : 0 < t ≤ T } as follows:[
λ?(t)
d
dtλ
?(t)
]
=
[
αac −1
αfwh −1
]−1 [
c′i(x
?
ac(t))
c′i(x
?
fwh(t))
]
We can hence recover any load trajectories using (16).
Fig. 3 shows that the SoC trajectory of pool pumps recovered using the optimal SoC trajectories of ACs and residential
water heaters matches the optimal SoC trajectory of pool pumps.
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Figure 3: SoC for pool pumps recovered using those of ACs and WHs.
6 Conclusions
It is a remarkable fact that a 2M -dimensional optimal control problem can be reduced to just two dimensions, re-
gardless of the number of load classes M . Beyond its computational value, the result provides new insight and has
potential economic implications.
The most valuable implication of Thm. 3.1 is for numerical computation. We are investigating how to best apply state
space collapse.
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Analysis of the resource allocation problem for demand dispatch in a stochastic control setting, considering the impact
of model uncertainty, is also a topic for future work.
We leave the reader to think over the following: can insight from the economic analysis be used to formulate contracts
for grid services with large aggregators and industrial customers? The prices would not be used for real-time control,
but they could be utilized to construct metrics in order to evaluate the performance of the participating consumers.
7 Appendix
We begin with further clarity on cheap control:
Lemma 7.1. For given t0 ≥ 0, suppose that (x(t0), z(t0)) and (x+, z+) are two state values satisfying xσ(t0) = x+σ ,
zσ(t0) = z
+
σ .
Then, for each δ > 0, there is a C∞ input u satisfying uσ(t) = 0 for all t ≥ t0, and the resulting state trajectory from
(x(t0), z(t0)) satisfies z(t0 + δ) = z+, x(t0 + δ) = x+ +O(δ), and x(t) is bounded on [t0, t0 + δ].
Proof. Without loss of generality we take t0 = 0. Let f : R → R+ be a C∞ probability density, with support on the
interval (0, δ), and choose
ui(t) = [z
+
i − zi(0)]f(t)− [x+i − xi(0)]f ′(t)
where f ′ denotes the derivative of f . This is a “cheap control”, since uσ(t) = 0 for all t. We then have by definition
zi(t) = zi(0) + [z
+
i − zi(0)]
∫ t
0
f(τ) dτ − [x+i − xi(0)]f(t)
This gives zi(δ) = z+i , and
xi(t) = e
−αitxi(0)−
∫ t
0
e−αi(t−τ)zi(τ) dτ
= xi(0)−
∫ t
0
zi(τ) dτ +O(δ)
= xi(0) + [x
+
i − xi(0)]
∫ t
0
f(τ) dτ +O(δ)
The SoC trajectory is bounded, and xi(δ) = x+i +O(δ). 
Proof of Prop. 2.1: It is obvious that J? is finite valued. To see that it is convex, let {(xi, zi) : i = 0, 1} denote two
initial conditions (starting at time t0), fix θ ∈ (0, 1), and denote (xθ, zθ) = (1− θ)(x0, z0) + θ(x1, z1). It remains to
show that J?(xθ, zθ, t0) ≤ (1 − θ)J?(x0, z0, t0) + θJ?(x1, z1, t0) for each t0. Consider any continuous input-state
trajectories:
{(ui[t0,T ], xi[t0,T ], zi[t0,T ]) : i = 0, 1}
with given initial conditions xi(t0) = xi, zi(t0) = zi. Because the system is linear, it follows that the convex
combination is feasible from (xθ, zθ): with uθ[t0,T ] defined as the convex combination of the inputs, the resulting state
trajectory is the convex combination (xθ[t0,T ], z
θ
[t0,T ]). Consequently,
J?(xθ, zθ, t0) ≤
∫ T
t0
c(xθ(t), zθ(t), uθ(t), t) dt
≤ (1− θ)
∫ T
t0
c(x0(t), z0(t), u0(t), t) dt+ θ
∫ T
t0
c(x1(t), z1(t), u1(t)) dt,
where the first inequality is the definition of J? as an infimum, and the second follows from convexity of the cost
function. The proof of (i) is completed on taking the infimum over ui[t0,T ] for each i = 0, 1.
We next prove (ii). It is clear from the definitions that K?(xσ, zσ, t0) ≤ J?(x, z, t0); we establish next the reverse
inequality, for each x, z, t0. For δ > 0 fixed, the following pair of bounds will be established:
K?(xσ, zσ, t0 + δ) ≤ K?(xσ, zσ, t0) +O(δ),
J?(x, z, t0) ≤ K?(xσ, zσ, t0 + δ) +O(δ).
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Since δ > 0 is arbitrary, these bounds are sufficient to establish (ii). The first inequality follows because the cost
function is non-negative, so only the second requires proof.
Let x?, z? ∈ RM denote the optimizers in (12), so that in particular x?σ = xσ , z?σ = zσ . Let u denote the input described
in Lemma 7.1 with x+ = x?, z+ = z?. The resulting state trajectory satisfies the conclusions of Lemma 7.1, so that
in particular xδ(t0 + δ) = x? +O(δ). We thus obtain the desired bound:
J?(x, z, t0) ≤
∫ t0+δ
t0
c(xδ(t), zδ(t), uδ(t)) dt+ J?(xδ(t0 + δ), z
δ(t0 + δ), t0 + δ)
= K?(xσ, zσ, t0 + δ) +O(δ).
The first inequality is due to Bellman’s principle of optimality, while the second approximation is a consequence of the
following: (i) the first cost term is bounded by O(δ) as a consequence of the cheap control input, (ii) J? is Lipschitz
with respect to the state variables (as it is convex), and (iii) the definition of K? in (12). 
Co-state dynamics:
The dynamics of the dual variables appearing in Prop. 3.3 are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 7.2. Let t0 ∈ (0, T ). The optimal input-state (u?, x?, z?) and dual variables {λ?, β?} satisfy the following
co-state equations:
d
dtλ
?
i (t) = αiλ
?
i (t)− c′i(x?(t)), (29a)
d
dtβ
?
i (t) = λ
?
i (t) + c
′
g(`(t)− z?σ(t)), t ∈ [t0, T ], (29b)
with boundary condition λ?i (T ) = 0, β?i (T ) = 0 for each i.
Proof. The state (x?(t), z?(t)) is continuously differentiable and the control u?(t) is continuous on [t0, T ] as a con-
sequence of (A2). In addition, the dynamics, eqs. (7d) and (7e), are linear and hence continuously differentiable with
respect to each of the variables. Further, (A1) implies that the cost function c in (9) is continuously differentiable with
respect to all the variables. Consequently, the optimal input-state pair u?, (x?, z?) satisfies Pontryagin’s minimum
principle on the closed interval [t0, T ] [28, Section 4.2]. The rest of the proof follows from this result. In particular,
the minimum principle implies
d
dtλ
?
i (t) = − ∂∂xH
(
x?(t), z?(t), u?(t), λ?(t), β?(t), t)
)
,
d
dtβ
?
i (t) = − ∂∂zH
(
x?(t), z?(t), u?(t), λ?(t), β?(t), t)
)
which yields (29a). The boundary conditions λ?i (T ) = β?i (T ) = 0 hold because there is no terminal cost [29, Theorem
1]. 
Optimal input for the descriptor system:
The next result provides the optimal input u?σ for the optimal descriptor system states (x
?
σ, z
?
σ):
Lemma 7.3. Let t0 ∈ (0, T ). The optimal input on [t0, T ] is
u?σ(t) =
d
dt`(t)−
1
2κ
β?i (t), t ∈ [t0, T ] (30)
Consequently, β?(t) := β?i (t), λ
?(t) := λ?i (t) are independent of i.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 7.2, the conclusion (30) is a consequence of Pontryagin’s minimum principle,
and the first-order condition for minimality:
0 = ∂∂uH
(
x?(t), z?(t), u?(t), λ?(t), β?(t), t)
)
This establishes (30), which then implies that β?i (t) is independent of i for each t. The conclusion that λ
?
i (t) is also
independent of i follows from eq. (29b). 
The lemma reinforces the co-state collapse identified in Prop. 3.3. The proof of the latter is provided next.
Proof of Prop. 3.3: The left hand equalities in (19) are a familiar result: the optimal co-state trajectory is the gradient
of the value function with respect to the state variable [30, Theorem 3.1]. The right-hand equalities are from the
definition (13). 
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Proof of Thm. 3.1: Equations (15a) and (15b) are the state equations. Equations (15c) and (15d) and the final time
boundary conditions on the co-state variables follow from Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3. The optimal feedback policy (15e) is
obtained from Lemma 7.3. The initial state mapping
(
x(0+), z(0+)
)
is given by (17).
As a consequence of (A2) and the fact that the cost functional is strictly convex with respect to the control and that the
dynamics are linear, the solution (x?, z?, λ?, β?, u?) satisfying Pontryagin’s minimum principle is both necessary and
sufficient for optimality [31, Chapter 7]. 
Proof of Prop. 3.4: As % ∈ C1, it follows from assumption (A1) and (8) that Lg,Li ∈ C1. Moreover, (g%(t), g˙%(t))
and (x%i (t), x˙
%
i (t)) are continuous on the half-open interval (0, T ]. Consequently, the Euler-Lagrange equations form
the necessary first-order conditions for weak extrema [28, Section 2.3.3]. The solution to the minimization problem in
(21) and (22) at the stationary minimum are the following Euler-Lagrange equations,
∂
∂gLg(g%, g˙%, t)− ddt ∂∂g˙Lg(g%, g˙%, t) = 0,
∂
∂xi
Li(x%i , x˙%i , t)− ddt ∂∂x˙iLi(x
%
i , x˙
%
i , t) = 0,
which result in (23) and (24), respectively. The terminal-time boundary conditions are obtained by, respectively, setting
∂
∂g˙Lg(g%, g˙%, t)|t=T = 0 and ∂∂x˙iLi(x
%
i , x˙
%
i , t)|t=T = 0 [28, Section 2.3.5]. 
Proof of Prop. 3.5: With t ∈ (0, T ], setting %(t) = −λ?(t) in (24) and comparing with (15c) yields x%i (t) = x?i (t)
for each i, which is the optimal solution to the primal problem (7a). This implies that there is no duality gap: −λ?
maximizes the dual functional φ?. 
Proof of Prop. 4.1: The proof follows from integrating (24) and (23) over (0, T ] and dividing throughout by T . In
particular, the error terms follow from the fundamental theorem of calculus. 
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